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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment for the defendants in a class 
action suit brought by over 200 current and former 
corrections officers against the City of Philadelphia and the 
City Prisons Commissioner. The officers, seeking overtime 
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
for the time they spent changing into and out of their 
uniforms, demand $1.4 million in overtime back pay for 
this change time, along with $1.4 million in liquidated 
damages, attorneys fees, and a court order requiring 
change time compensation in the future. For the reasons 
that follow, we affirm. 
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I. 
 
The FLSA actually speaks directly to this issue. Under 
S 207(a)(1), employers must pay their employees an 
overtime wage for hours worked in excess of forty hours per 
week. See 29 U.S.C. S 207(a)(1). We assume arguendo, as 
plaintiffs would have us do, that clothes and uniform 
change time would ordinarily be included within hours 
worked.1 Section 203(o), however, provides a specific 
exclusion from the calculation of hours worked for clothes 
and uniform change time: 
 
        Hours Worked.--In determining for the purposes of 
       sections 206 and 207 of this title the hours for which 
       an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any 
       time spent in changing clothes or washing at the 
       beginning or end of each workday which was excluded 
       from measured working time during the week involved 
       by the express terms of or by custom or practice under 
       a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable 
       to the particular employee. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 203(o). The express terms of the relevant 
collective bargaining agreement in this case do not mention 
an exclusion of change time from hours worked. The 
dispositive issue, therefore, is whether there is a"custom or 
practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement" 
in the Philadelphia corrections system of excluding change 
time from compensable hours worked. 
 
Because this is an appeal from the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, in order to succeed on 
appeal plaintiffs need to demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a"custom 
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement" exists. Judge Waldman, the author of the 
District Court's opinion, did not think such a genuine issue 
was created, in light of the following uncontroverted facts: 
 
       (1) The City of Philadelphia has not compensated 
       corrections officers for change time for over 30 years. 
 
       (2) Every collective bargaining agreement between the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defendants do not dispute this point. 
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       City of Philadelphia and the corrections officers' union 
       --the American Federation of State, County and 
       Municipal Employees District Council 33, Local 159B-- 
       has been silent as to compensation for uniform change 
       time. 
 
       (3) William Turner, one of the lead plaintiffs, served for 
       some time as the union's president. During his tenure 
       (between June 1994 and June 1997), he proposed at 
       several labor management meetings with the 
       Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Prisons, 
       and with Philadelphia's Labor Relations Administrator, 
       that change time be made compensable. However, the 
       union did not make this request in formal collective 
       bargaining negotiations. At the same time, the union 
       did ask for and receive a uniform maintenance 
       allowance and overtime compensation for the one hour 
       per week that corrections officers spent at mandatory 
       pre-shift roll calls. 
 
       (4) The union never filed a grievance or demanded 
       arbitration based on the non-compensability of change 
       time. 
 
II. 
 
According to Judge Waldman, corrections officers' 
acquiescence to not being compensated for change time can 
constitute a "custom or practice under a bona fide 
collective-bargaining agreement" for purposes ofS 203(o). 
See Turner v. City of Philadelphia, 96 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461- 
62 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Judge Waldman believed that the 
uncontroverted facts listed above sufficed to establish 
acquiescence on the officers' part. Consequently, he 
concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
as to the existence of such a "custom or practice under a 
bona fide collective-bargaining agreement," and entered 
summary judgment for the defendants. We agree. 
 
The sole legal issue, both before Judge Waldman and 
again on this appeal, concerns the proper reading of the 
phrase "custom or practice under a collective-bargaining 
agreement." Plaintiffs have insisted that a "custom or 
practice" within the meaning of S 203(o ) cannot arise unless 
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the particular issue that is the subject of the"custom or 
practice" was raised in formal collective bargaining 
negotiations. We have examined the cases cited by plaintiffs 
in their briefs in support of this proposition, see, e.g., 
Arcadi v. Nestle Food Corp., 38 F.3d 672, 675 (2d Cir. 
1994); Hoover v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 455 F.2d 387, 
389 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams v. W.R. Grace & Co., Davidson 
Chem. Div., 247 F. Supp. 433, 435 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); none 
of these cases, however, makes the existence of formal 
negotiations a necessary element.2 
 
Plaintiffs' reading of 203(o)'s "custom or practice" 
exclusion turns heavily on their interpretation of the phrase 
"under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement." 29 
U.S.C. S 203(o). According to plaintiffs, the phrase "under a 
bona fide collective-bargaining agreement" means that a 
"custom or practice" of non-compensability cannot come 
into being unless (1) the issue of compensability is 
specifically raised in formal collective bargaining 
negotiations, and then (2) dropped by the negotiators.3 
Stated in a slightly different fashion, plaintiffs argue that 
they cannot have forfeited their FLSA right to change time 
compensation time by having failed to contest the 
Department of Corrections' 30-year-old policy of non- 
compensability; in their submission, to establish a"custom 
or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining 
agreement" for S 203(o) purposes, one must show a specific 
abandonment of the compensability issue at a formal 
negotiation session. 
 
We think that plaintiffs interpret the phrase "custom or 
practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement" 
too narrowly, placing undue emphasis on the clause"under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Defendants in fact point to a decision from the District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas, which states: "The parties are not required to 
have raised the issue of not compensating employees for clothes- 
changing time in formal collective bargaining negotiations for the 
provisions of 29 U.S.C. S 203(o) to apply." Bejil v. Ethicon, Inc., 125 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 197 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
 
3. If the formal collective bargaining negotiations result in the 
inclusion 
of a specific non-compensability provision in the collective bargaining 
agreement, the S 203(o) exclusion would apply because change time is 
made non-compensable by the "express terms of " the agreement. 
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a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement" while virtually 
reading the clause "custom or practice" out ofS 203(o). In 
essence, plaintiffs construe "custom or practice under a 
bona fide collective-bargaining agreement" as"custom or 
practice established through formal collective bargaining 
negotiations." To the contrary, we view the phrase as simply 
restating the well-established principle of labor law that a 
particular custom or practice can become an implied term 
of a labor agreement through a prolonged period of 
acquiescence. See, e.g., Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. 
v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1969); 
Bonnell/Tredegar Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 339, 344 
(4th Cir. 1995); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Norfolk & 
Western Ry. Co., 833 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Chicago & 
North Western Transp. Co., 827 F.2d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 
1987). 
 
Moreover, as Judge Waldman observed when plaintiffs 
made this legal contention, plaintiffs have offered no good 
reason justifying their proposed reading. See Turner, 96 F. 
Supp. 2d at 463. At oral argument on this appeal, plaintiffs 
did offer a slim rationale, which we find unpersuasive. 
Plaintiffs argued that formal negotiations are required for a 
"custom or practice" of non-compensability to exist because 
plaintiffs have a pre-existing statutory right under the FLSA 
to compensation for uniform change time. The fatal flaw in 
plaintiffs' rationale, however, is its failure to acknowledge 
that the scope of this FLSA right is specifically cabined by 
S 203(o)'s "custom or practice" exclusion, i.e., its exclusion 
from compensable hours worked of "any time spent in 
changing clothes . . . which was excluded from measured 
working time . . . by the express terms of or by custom or 
practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement." 
29 U.S.C. S 203(o). The fact that plaintiffs may possess a 
general, antecedent right under the FLSA to have change 
time included in compensable hours worked, therefore, is 
simply irrelevant to the logically subsequent question 
whether a "custom or practice" of non-compensation 
existed, thereby triggering S 203(o)'s provision mandating 
that the change time covered by that "custom or practice" 
be excluded from compensable hours worked. 
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III. 
 
Because the uncontroverted facts establish plaintiffs' 
long-standing acquiescence to a "custom or practice" of the 
non-compensability of change time, the judgment of the 
District Court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                9 
